Climate change, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

Pacific Island nations are geographically vulnerable to climate change pressures, including rising sea levels, desalination, and extreme weather events. In 2020, Cyclone Harold struck the area, which is the most recent tragic example of this vulnerability. The PIF have often highlighted these regional challenges, with its 2018 ‘Boe Declaration on Regional Security’ stating that “climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific” [14]. The PIF have stated a strong commitment to implementing the policy objectives of the Paris Climate Accords.

Pacific Island leaders have repeatedly called for Australia to take stronger action regarding its climate policy. Fiji’s Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama recently called for Australia and other developed nations to “come with commitments for serious cuts in emissions by 2030 –– 50% or more” before the COP26 summit [15]. While Australia has made significant investments in climate resilient infrastructure and renewable energy, more can be done to embed climate policy objectives within regional security frameworks to help alleviate these concerns.

Another limitation of Australia’s ‘Pacific Step-Up’ has been that it is often viewed as being unilateral in nature. Dr. Wesley Morgan, a research fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, has argued that Australia has thus far paid “insufficient attention to Pacific-led processes of regional cooperation” [16]. “Pacific regionalism has developed its own guiding ideas, shared norms, and even regional sources of international law – all of which are important to Pacific Island countries”, Morgan argues, therefore the largely unilateral approach to the ‘Step-Up’ could stand to benefit from increasing consultation efforts, “[developing] regional initiatives together with Island states” [18]. Working closely with the PIF to finalise the 2050 Blue Pacific strategy, which was previously expected to be delivered in 2021, could help Australia to begin remedying this perception [19]. This would help to solidify its reputation as a regional stakeholder with a distinct role separate from its traditional security approach of ‘strategic denial’.

There has been increased recent discussion of the prospect of Australia hosting the 2024 COP29 Climate Summit. If the summit is to take place in Australia, a Pacific Islands partnership should be prioritised, consulting with each of the 14 Pacific Island leaders beforehand [20]. The 2022 federal budget has pledged to double the funding of the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific to $3 billion [21], which would see renewed focus on “climate-resilient infrastructure”[22], however it is Australia’s diplomatic engagement regarding climate security which also needs to be expanded. By concretely pledging to the Pacific Islands Forum to not only meet its target of net zero carbon emissions by 2050, but to significantly reduce emissions by 2030, Australia can further demonstrate that it shares and prioritises the genuine concerns of its Pacific partners.

A recent Royal Australian Air Force deployment has assisted ground efforts by the Australian Medical Assistance Team (AUSMAT) to provide essential COVID-19 relief packages and personnel [23]. This provides a foundational example for future cooperative health and food assistance efforts. Specific provinces targeted due to “experiencing a surge in COVID-19 cases” could potentially see other emergency aid distributed under similar protocols [24]. In the event of a future humanitarian crisis, emergency relief efforts like AUSMAT should be expanded into a multilateral partnership with neighbouring countries. This could include requesting the United States’ assistance in delivering and improving vital healthcare services, and developing a more regular rotation of clinicians stationed in the Solomons. AUSMAT can also provide a more in-depth skills transfer in provincial public health sectors outside Honiara.

The United States intends to re-open its embassy in the Solomon Islands, which can provide a de-politicised civic engagement initiative with communities across the islands [25]. This undertaking strengthens public health services on a much more permanent, mutually beneficial basis, and does so outside of the typical framework of self-interested great power competition.

Maritime security co-operation

Maritime security provides another opportunity for closer regional security cooperation with the United States, which involves improving intelligence sharing to better protect and preserve Pacific Islands fisheries. The US has recently adopted a strategy of “deploying Coast Guard ships to the region under ‘Shiprider’ agreements, which allow the local authorities to board American vessels and enforce local and international fishing laws” [26]. Operation SOLANIA has also sought to complement the pre-existing “aerial surveillance component of the Australian Government’s Maritime Security Program, which provides contracted aircraft for the FFA to use up to 365 days a year across 15 Pacific Island nations” [27]. This operation involved “a Royal Australian Air Force C-27J Spartan aircraft [providing] aerial surveillance”[28] and helped support the coordinated maritime surveillance and patrol operations of the Pacific Island Forum Fisheries Agency [29].

These existing approaches to maritime surveillance should be expanded on a formalised, multilateral basis. This would seek to improve the future coordination of similar operations, while enhancing the abilities of regional partners to track, prosecute and prevent theft and overfishing. A recent appendix to Australia’s 2022-23 Portfolio Budget Statements regarding the Defence Cooperation Program has also set a future precedent for this, stating that “The key area of growth in 2022-23 is in multilateral activities under the Pacific Patrol Boat Program / Pacific Maritime Security Program” [30].

Economic development and soft power

Uneven development gains regarding resource distribution and critical infrastructure have been identified as some of the root causes of inter-ethnic conflict on the Islands, notably between Guadalcanal and Malaita. The Solomon Islands’ economy has also been heavily reliant upon logging exports, which are vulnerable to natural disasters and price shocks. Providing minimal local returns in rural areas, they have also been marked by contentious land rights arrangements. Although existing infrastructure projects like the Tina River hydropower facility [31] are essential in providing renewable energy to the Islands, more can be done outside Honiara to diversify the economy and avoid the further entrenchment of ‘clientelism’[32].

Australia has the capacity to provide leadership through soft power as the preferred development partner for the Solomons. This includes technological developments, including expanded access to broadcasting and telecommunications networks. It can also include, as Dr. Anthony Bergin has suggested, a renewed focus on “[establishing] an emerging business leaders program of mentorship and training programs for Pacific entrepreneurs” [33], achieved through a public-private partnership with leading business schools in Australia and the United States.

Diplomatic outreach

In order to step up its diplomatic efforts, Australia’s approach to regional security dialogues and co-operation should be reconsidered. Professor Joanne Wallis and Dr. Anna Powles, two specialists on the Pacific region, have argued that Australia can do much more to include Pacific nations directly in collective security dialogues, instead of sidelining them. Wallis and Powles contend that this should include more multilateral security dialogues, whether they are formal or informal, including Track 1.5 security dialogues [34]. These dialogues, involving “Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Islands officials and non-governmental experts”, can be held on a regular basis to provide further clarification and consensus on collective security priorities [35]. The 2020 “Australia–New Zealand–United States Pacific Security Cooperation Dialogue” [36], specifically sought to include representatives of the Pacific Islands on its panel and reportedly resulted in positive discussions. Holding more of these dialogues in the future, whether on an annual or biannual basis, should serve to improve mutual trust and help provide greater assurances regarding future security co-operation.