Introduction

Japan’s recent invitation to observe AUKUS’ Pillar II Maritime Big Play series signals a pivotal shift in Japanese security relations amid an evolving and fragile Indo-Pacific backdrop. With AUKUS reaching its third anniversary on September 15, talk of Japan’s potential involvement has not subsided. The inclusion of Japan within the AUKUS framework, particularly through Pillar II brings with it many challenges and benefits. One of the major challenges Japan faces is its historically insufficient cybersecurity and counterintelligence measures, affecting its reliability in safeguarding critical information. Along with constitutional and infrastructural restraints, Japan faces many hurdles in its campaign to engage within the AUKUS Pillar II framework. However, Japan has in recent times sought to alleviate these domestic security and constitutional challenges and continues to strive towards a more proactive approach to security and defence collaboration. This policy brief will recommend Japan’s involvement through an ad-hoc approach whereby Japan can seek involvement in certain projects, benefiting both itself and the AUKUS nations and further heighten levels of interoperability within these nations’ defence systems. Through further legal amendments and investment in technological research & development (R&D), Japan is on course to become the first nation since its announcement, to collaborate within the trilateral AUKUS agreement.

AUKUS Pillar II

It is imperative to understand the nature and structural framework of the AUKUS agreement to analyse how Japan’s involvement in such an ambitious multilateral agreement could function. The AUKUS agreement is divided into two separate “Pillars” where Pillar I is centred on the construction and Australian acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines, while Pillar II is a formalised commitment between the three nations to share “advanced” or “enhanced” (but non-nuclear) capabilities [1]. Under the title of “Pillar II”, four initial advanced capabilities were established in 2021. However, with the shifting geopolitical landscape and security interests within the Indo-Pacific, work on a further four additional areas has commenced, outlining a total of eight “advanced capabilities”[2]. These are listed as: undersea, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence and autonomy, advanced cyber, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, electronic warfare; and a broader two focus areas on innovation and information sharing [3]. AUKUS Pillar II within a broader geopolitical perspective, will “seek to engage allies and close partners as appropriate”, thus creating a window of opportunity for Japan to establish interest in selected programs [4]. It is within this broad framework of “technological innovation and development” that Japan can seek involvement for both its national interest and regional security.

Challenges and Considerations of Involvement

With Japan showing interest in participating within the sphere of the AUKUS agreement [5], there are several challenges and considerations that may limit Japanese participation. One of the most significant hurdles Japan faces is their lack of involvement in the Five Eyes (FVEY) Intelligence initiative. This is due to many significant reasons such as the lack of a centralised security agency and insufficient security measures as well as the nature of their ‘pacifist constitution’ as outlined in Article 9 and legal hurdles regarding intelligence capabilities [6], further pronouncing challenges for Japan’s involvement in AUKUS Pillar II.

The lack of a central security agency is an issue Japan currently faces in advancing a more proactive approach to global and regional security and intelligence involvement.  The FVEY network is structured on a framework of collection and analysis of digital intelligence, and Japan currently has no single centralised government agency dedicated towards data security and protection like the NSA in the US or the GCHQ in the UK [7]. Without a centralised government agency, Japanese counterintelligence capabilities can be perceived as inadequate in seeking membership with high calibre intelligence and security initiatives such as FVEY and AUKUS. Cyberattacks fall into the same category, although reformed in recent years, Japan are still in the process of development to reach the status quo of the AUKUS nations.

With the recent changes in Japanese government giving rise to coalition instability [8], the pacifist nature of the Japanese constitution may provide further challenges and considerations regarding the advancement of multilateral intelligence cooperation. As article 9 expressly renounced war as a national right and forbade the use of threat or violence as a means to settle international disputes [9], the extent to which Japan may become involved in intelligence and security networks had been limited. However, under the Abe administration of 2014, a reinterpretation of article 9 was officially recognised allowing Japan to engage in collective self-defence, paving the way for a future of expansive military and global security participation [10]. Article 9 has thus become less of an issue and more of a consideration when striving for involvement in multilateral security partnerships. The legislative challenges this poses are also significant as by not being able to physically change the constitution, Japan must rely on legal amendments to strengthen counterintelligence and security capabilities, which has only found further instability due the shifting Japanese political climate.

A further challenge posed by the involvement in AUKUS is the implications it may present for Japan’s relationship with China. China is Japan’s current largest trading partner and deep economic ties have fostered a level of mutual interdependence within both nations [11]. Becoming involved with AUKUS would signal a shift in Japan’s regional strategic approach, prioritising a partnership with like-minded democracies, potentially escalating regional tensions and instigating diplomatic repercussions [12]. Involvement in AUKUS may also reshape the regional security architecture, enhancing Japan’s partnerships with Australia, the US and the UK, while potentially fracturing unity of regional multilateral initiatives such as ASEAN who have sought to maintain regional neutrality [13].

Strategic Interests and Benefits of Involvement

Although posing significant challenges and hurdles for Japan and the surrounding region, the benefits that arise from collaboration within the Pillar II framework cannot be understated. Japan’s involvement in Pillar II presents significant advantages, strengthening its defence capabilities, fostering interoperability within the Indo-Pacific region, as well as stimulating economic and industrial growth, specifically within the defence sector.

Participation in Pillar II carries the potential to bolster Japan’s defence capabilities and enhance its cyber and information security. With Japan’s current national security strategy placing a heavy emphasis on strengthening cyber defences to be on par with cybersecurity of leading Western nations, involvement in particular projects within the broader frame of Pillar II would heavily promote this approach [14]. Its deep industrial base in autonomous and robotic systems is also heavily sought out by the AUKUS nations and may provide significant benefits in technological experimentation if cooperation proceeds [15]. This would encompass a more proactive approach from Japan in alleviating current regional tensions and further reinforce Japan’s commitment to maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific.