India’s Support of Southeast Asia States in the South China Sea Disputes
25 October 2024 | Hong Quynh Luu
About the author
Hong Quynh Luu is a second-year Master’s student in International Relations. Quynh aspires to pursue a research career in maritime security and the geopolitical competition among major powers in the Indo-Pacific, particularly India and China. She is especially intrigued by critical geopolitical theories, which examine how everyday understandings of geopolitical imaginations shape and influence foreign policy decisions and broader geopolitical narratives.
Executive Summary
India’s Act East Policy (AEP) was launched in 2014 to continue and expand the Look East Policy from the early 1990s. The AEP aims to enhance economic cooperation, cultural exchanges, and strategic ties with Asia-Pacific countries, particularly ASEAN nations. The policy has successfully elevated some of India’s relationships with ASEAN countries to a strategic level. However, India’s maritime security engagement with ASEAN countries, whilst growing, still remains limited.
The political landscape in the region faces challenges due to China’s assertion of the nine-dash line in the South China Sea (SCS). These Southeast Asian countries, with their limited economic and military capabilities, rely on international law (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982) and international support to address these challenges. Despite legal measures finding against China’s actions and promises of a Code of Conduct (CoC), effective resolutions remain elusive.
India also shares some of the same territorial concerns with Southeast Asian countries about China’s recent actions. Specifically, the border conflict with China has become more tense in recent times, as shown by the military conflicts at the border that occurred between the two countries in 2014 and 2017, but especially since 2020. In addition, China’s military presence is also more clearly present in the Indian Ocean, an area considered to be India’s backyard, through a larger naval and maritime presence associated with the BRI initiative [1].
In recent years, India has become more robust in its support for the rule of law in the SCS and also in broader maritime and security cooperation with key claimant states. This policy brief argues that India must strengthen its security partnerships with littoral and island nations of the SCS, especially key countries in the dispute, the Philippines and Vietnam, in order to secure its broader regional interests. The policy brief will assess the similarities between India and Southeast Asian countries in their relations with China, the challenges India has faced in implementing the AEP, and propose shifting the focus of the AEP toward security and defence links with Vietnam and the Philippines.
What Is India’s Current Relationship with ASEAN After The 10-Year Endourse Of AEP?
The AEP policy is becoming a central pillar of India’s foreign relations, guiding its approach to the Indo-Pacific. This region spans the Indian and Pacific Oceans, including many key economies and strategic sea routes. Under this policy, India has expanded its relationships with Southeast Asian countries as its core objective. These ties have deepened across various sectors, such as healthcare, education, agriculture, trade and investment, technology, green energy, and cultural exchanges [2].
India has established growing ties and become a strategic partner to several Southeast Asian countries. For instance, India has a comprehensive strategic partnership with Vietnam and a strategic partnership with the Philippines. Nonetheless, the impact of India’s relationship with ASEAN countries is still somewhat limited. According to a 2024 survey conducted by the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS, India ranks 9th as a preferred strategic dialogue partner of choice for ASEAN countries, as well as 9th in both Vietnam and the Philippines [3].
Figure 1: Ranking Order of Preferred Dialogue Partners by ASEAN member states. Source: ASEAN Studies Centre. “The Southeast Asia 2024 Survey Report,” April 2, 2024.
What does India Need to do Differently, and Why?
Many ASEAN nations view India more as a soft power ally rather than a substantial strategic partner [4]. This is reflected in the relatively low bilateral trade (by value) between India and these countries. India’s trade with Vietnam and the Philippines is $14.82 billion [5] and $3.05 billion [6], respectively. Meanwhile, Vietnam’s trade with the United States and China amounts to $38.6 billion and $59.6 billion [7], respectively. The Philippines’ bilateral trade with the US and China is $19.97 billion and $40.32 billion [8]. These figures suggest that India’s influence in ASEAN is constrained and has not met the AEP’s goals.
Figure 2: India is not listed among Vietnam’s top five major trading partners. Source: Vietnam Briefing
Several obstacles hinder the effectiveness of India’s AEP in strengthening connectivity with the Philippines and Vietnam. First, India does not share a common border with these countries, which creates transportation and infrastructure challenges. The sea route remains the most economical transport option [9]. Second, the incomplete implementation of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) institutions has contributed to trade imbalances, hampering bilateral economic cooperation [10].
Furthermore, the people-to-people ties, a central focus of the AEP, have not effectively bolstered India’s sway in the Philippines and Vietnam. The Mausam project, an Indian initiative to promote a shared monsoon culture across the Indo-Pacific region, has not generated substantial interest in these countries [11]. Moreover, the relatively small size of the Hindu diaspora in Vietnam and the Philippines, along with the limited presence of Vietnamese and Filipino communities in India, has constrained the effort to foster meaningful interactions and connections.
Amidst escalating tensions in the SCS, India has a unique opportunity to bolster its influence in Vietnam and the Philippines. India has been demonstrating increased support for these nations in their regional disputes. Emphasising defence cooperation over economic ties could prove to be a more effective means of solidifying their engagement. This strategy mirrors the U.S.-Australia defence alliance, where despite China being Australia’s top economic partner, the United States remains Australia’s primary strategic focus in the broader Indo-Pacific region [12].
Several military equipment transfers and procurements between India and ASEAN countries have recently occurred. For instance, in 2022, the Philippines signed a $375 million deal with India to buy the three batteries of BrahMos (anti-ship) missiles, which were developed in collaboration with Russia, and technical support for the system for the Coastal Defense Regiment of the Philippine Marine Corps [13]. In April 2024, India successfully delivered the first batch of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles to the Philippines [14]. Over the past few years, the Philippines has increasingly considered India a key partner in modernising its armed forces [15].
Vietnam, which has traditionally relied on Russia as its main source of arms, now faces new challenges. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has increased its economic and geostrategic dependence on China. This development has raised concerns in Vietnam about the potential for Russia to prioritise Chinese support over Vietnamese interests [16]. Furthermore, the ongoing tensions between Russia and the European Union, as well as the United States, have placed Vietnam in a challenging position, prompting it to explore diversifying its sources of arms away from Russia [17]. Therefore, with its expanding defence capabilities, India is well-positioned to emerge as a significant supplier of military equipment to Southeast Asian nations.
In 2022, India and Vietnam signed a memorandum of understanding on the “India-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement (JVS) on Defence Cooperation towards 2030,” along with a mutual logistics support agreement [18]. This agreement marks a significant step forward in defence cooperation, allowing the two militaries to use each other’s military bases for repairs and resupply. In 2024, India offered a $300 million line of credit to Vietnam to support the enhancement of Vietnam’s maritime security [19]. This proposal was made during a high-level meeting between the two prime ministers in Hanoi.
Background of the South China Sea Dispute
With the rapid growth in various dimensions, including economy, polity and the military, China has expanded into the SCS with its so-called ‘nine-dash line’ claim. This line encompasses a vast area of the SCS, covering over 80% of its total area, and includes waters that are also claimed by other neighbouring countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan [20]. The legality of China’s nine-dash line has been widely disputed, with many countries and international organisations regarding it as a violation of international law, particularly under UNCLOS. In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that China’s nine-dash line had no legal basis and that China’s claims in the SCS were invalid under international law.
Figure 3: China’s Nine-Dash Line Claim in the South China Sea
Despite the ruling, China continues asserting its claims in the region, escalating tensions with Vietnam and the Philippines. On May 15, 2024, China implemented a policy authorising its coast guard to detain foreigners for up to 60 days if they are found in waters China claims as its own [21]. A week later, on May 23, 2024, Vietnam protested the presence of a Chinese naval hospital ship in the Paracel Islands [22]. Meanwhile, the Philippines accused China of deliberately provoking conflict in the SCS by ramming their vessels, damaging ships with water cannons, and puncturing rubber boats with knives [23]. Moreover, China has also been accused of building artificial islands and military installations in disputed waters [24].
Figure 4: Fiery Cross Reef is one of China’s seven artificial islands in the Spratly Islands and represents a continued military presence in the region. Source: SkySat, CC BY 2.0 , via Wikimedia Commons
What do the Southeast Asian Countries Need?
One common feature of ASEAN countries is their significant economic dependence on the Chinese economy. This creates favourable conditions for China to enforce trade sanctions and pressure these countries into compliance on various issues, leading to economic instability. In 2012, China, the top importer of bananas from the Philippines, ceased its purchases after discovering pests in the imported fruit. This embargo caused substantial economic harm to the Philippines, putting an estimated 200,000 people at risk of losing their livelihoods if the import restrictions persisted [25]. Importantly, this trade restriction was imposed amid escalating tensions between the Philippines and China regarding the Scarborough Shoals dispute in the SCS. To alleviate the economic impact and diminish vulnerability to pressure from Beijing during such disputes, both Vietnam and the Philippines have actively pursued trade diversification strategies, seeking to bolster economic connections with other nations.
Additionally, negotiations to establish a code of conduct in the SCS between China and ASEAN nations have seen minimal advancement since their commencement in 2013. Several factors have contributed to this lack of progress. Firstly, not all ASEAN member states have territorial waters or disputes in the SCS. For example, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand do not have direct stakes in the matter. However, establishing a code of conduct necessitates consensus among all ASEAN members and the approval of China. Given China’s status as a significant creditor to various ASEAN countries through its BRI infrastructure projects, it holds considerable influence over the decision-making of these nations. This influence could hinder or prolong the negotiation process. For instance, Laos, slated to assume the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2024, may encounter challenges in progressing the negotiations on the code of conduct due to its landlocked status and heavy reliance on China, with over 50% of its public debt being owed to China [26].
Secondly, littoral and island nations such as Vietnam and the Philippines were eager to establish a code of conduct to oversee China’s land reclamation efforts and address alleged violations of the UNCLOS concerning maritime freedom and security [27]. However, with China’s extensive island-building activities in the SCS largely concluded, the motivation for countries like Vietnam and the Philippines to advocate for a code of conduct has waned. As a result, they are shifting their focus towards constructing their own islands and seeking to counterbalance China’s military influence with the assistance of third nations [28].
Figure 5: Locations of Vietnam’s Land Reclamation in the Spratly Islands
The stability and peace in the SCS are dependent on upholding the international norms collectively agreed upon by the global community. The UNCLOS 1982 plays a central role in providing a legal framework for managing maritime issues and resolving disputes. Despite being a signatory to UNCLOS, China’s actions in the SCS, particularly its insistence on the “nine-dash line,” demonstrate a complex relationship with international law. By citing historical rights and customary law predating UNCLOS, China asserts its legitimate claims over large portions of the SCS, using this interpretation to justify its expansive territorial claims and challenge the existing international maritime order [29].
However, China’s efforts to reinterpret or bypass international law are limited by the existing legal framework and the potential repercussions of disregarding established norms. International law, particularly UNCLOS, continues to significantly restrict China’s policy choices, even as it endeavours to justify its actions through alternative legal arguments [30]. This highlights the crucial role of the international community in upholding the principles outlined in UNCLOS. The global community’s support for resolving disputes in the SCS within the framework of UNCLOS is vital to holding China accountable to international legal standards. Both Vietnam and the Philippines need widespread international backing to exert pressure on China. This support is essential to curb Beijing’s aggressive behaviour and maintain the rule of law at sea.
India is increasingly showing its support for Vietnam and the Philippines in upholding their claims in the SCS dispute. During the QUAD meeting in July 2024, the foreign ministers of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States expressed their concerns about any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the SCS through force or coercion [31]. Additionally, the four nations pledged to enhance maritime security in the region, delivering a strong message to China about their unified position in preserving regional stability.
Why is Security in the South China Sea Important to India?
The SCS is of immense strategic importance to India, not only because of its economic and energy interests but also due to the geopolitical challenges posed by China’s expanding influence in the region. According to the Ministry of Defence’s annual report, the sea plays a crucial role in India’s economic development, with about 95% of Indian trade by volume and 70% by value transported via maritime routes [32]. Notably, over 55% of India’s sea-borne trade passes through the SCS, including essential imports like oil and natural gas, as well as exports to East Asian and Southeast Asian markets [33]. Any disruption in this region could severely impact India’s economy, especially its energy security and trade flows.
India’s involvement in the SCS extends beyond trade. The country has significant investments in the region’s oil and gas sectors, particularly through ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL), which has been actively engaged in oil exploration and production in Vietnamese waters [34]. The SCS is rich in hydrocarbon resources, and India’s participation in these activities is crucial for securing its energy needs amid increasing domestic demands.
Moreover, India views the SCS dispute through the lens of its bilateral competition with China. If China succeeds in pressuring weaker states to relinquish their maritime claims, it could embolden Beijing to adopt a more aggressive stance in resolving border disputes with India. This concern is particularly relevant given the long-standing territorial disputes between China and India, which span 3,440 km in the Himalayas. The two nations have experienced numerous border clashes since their 1962 war, with relations deteriorating further after the Galwan clash in June 2020, which resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers [35]. The conflict marked the first fatal confrontation between the two countries since 1975. Tensions escalated again in September 2021 when China accused Indian troops of illegally crossing the disputed border and firing warning shots, allegations India has denied [36]. If true, this would have been the first instance of shots being fired in the region since a 1996 agreement banned the use of firearms and explosives along the border.
Furthermore, China’s BRI significantly challenges India’s dominance in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Except Bhutan, all South Asian countries have joined the BRI, and China’s investments in strategically important ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, the Maldives, and several small African island nations have raised concerns in New Delhi. India worries that the BRI could facilitate China’s establishment of military logistics facilities in multiple countries along the Indo-Pacific maritime route, including India’s immediate neighbours. For instance, Sri Lanka was forced to lease the Hambantota port to China for 99 years due to its inability to repay debts [37]. Pakistan faces the possibility of default and may have to cede control of Gwadar port to China [38].
Thus, the SCS is a critical juncture in this broader strategy. By asserting control over this maritime region, China can project power more effectively across the Indo-Pacific, potentially encircling India and undermining its role as a security provider in the Indian Ocean Region. Therefore, ensuring the security of the SCS is vital for India to counterbalance China’s growing influence in its immediate and extended neighbourhood.
Policy Recommendations
- Strengthen bilateral security ties with key ASEAN States – India should intensify its defence partnerships with Vietnam and the Philippines. This could include increasing military-to-military exchanges, joint exercises, and technology transfers. Also, India should provide military assistance and training programs to the armed forces of Vietnam and the Philippines.
- Enhance India’s maritime capabilities in the Indo-Pacific – India should expand its naval presence in the Indo-Pacific to counterbalance China’s influence, particularly in the SCS. This could involve increasing the frequency of naval patrols, conducting joint exercises with ASEAN navies, and establishing more port calls in Southeast Asia.
- Promote economic diversification – India should support Vietnam and the Philippines in diversifying trade away from China by enhancing bilateral trade and investment. This can be achieved through targeted investments in sectors such as information technology, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure, as well as the negotiation of more comprehensive trade agreements.
- Support ASEAN’s Code of Conduct efforts – India should offer diplomatic support and participate in multilateral discussions to support ASEAN’s efforts to establish a binding CoC in the SCS.
- Increase pressure on China – India can help build a coalition that pressures China to adhere to international norms and rulings by aligning with like-minded nations such as Australia, Japan and the US.
Conclusion
India must play a pivotal role in the SCS disputes, as this is essential for maintaining regional stability and safeguarding its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. In the last decade, India has developed stronger relationships with Southeast Asian nations, especially Vietnam and the Philippines. Despite this, there is still untapped potential in security, which has become increasingly crucial due to the escalating tensions in the SCS and China’s assertive stance. Thus, to effectively counterbalance China’s growing influence, India needs to readjust its approach to prioritise security and defence cooperation with the countries bordering the SCS.
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