Violations of International Maritime Law: How Joint Capacity Building between Australia, Japan and Regional States Can Generate Greater Peace for the Indo-Pacific

August 2024  | Ciara Hu

About the author

Ciara Hu is a Research Analyst Intern in the Semester 1 2024 DSI Internship Program. She is in her final year of a Bachelor of Arts double majoring in Political Science and International Relations, and Law and Society at the University of Western Australia.

In an increasingly globalised and technological world, conflict at sea and illegal maritime activities are rising areas of concern, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. As a result, intra-regional cooperation remains crucial to address current threats and challenges. The development of joint capacity building initiatives and greater Australia-Japan cooperation with regional maritime states will be critical to strengthening maritime security capabilities to foster a more peaceful Indo-Pacific. Amidst rising tensions in the South China Sea and a growing neglect of international legal standards, Australia should recognise the significant regional role it must play as a maritime nation.

This policy brief calls for a closer review of Australia’s current maritime security initiatives with Japan. It will explore the potential for both nations to take a step further and promote international norms, support a regional mechanism to protect human rights, and advocate for stricter adherence within the Indo-Pacific to legal instruments such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). To achieve this, the Australian government must engage in broader consultation with internal and external stakeholders and act on its strategic partnership with Japan through hard security measures, Indo-Pacific investment and technological development schemes.

Introduction

Shifting from trading partners in the late 1800s to special strategic partners in 2014, Australia-Japan relations continue to deepen in the 21st century [1]. However, the two are yet to make significant progress in promoting international maritime law on a regional level. Despite their middle power status, both can play greater roles in driving intra-regional peace and inspiring confidence in a sustainable future for the Indo-Pacific [2].

The Indian and Pacific Oceans are important trade facilitators, although they are undoubtedly also sites of conflict and aggression. Since the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration, which rejected any Chinese territorial or maritime claim to areas determined by the Tribunal to be part of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf, the superpower has committed a steady wave of offences in the Indo-Pacific [3]. Driven by notions of the ‘nine-dash line,’ China has openly expressed its indifference, deeming the 2016 judgment as “null and void…(with) no binding force” [4]. Other demonstrations of aggression in late 2023, including an unprovoked attack on Australian divers using sonar technology, have been a wakeup call for regional maritime states [5]. Chinese ‘lawfare’ strategies and coercion in the South China Sea have proven to pose an immediate risk to the legitimacy of international law and the safety of maritime personnel [6]. On top of this, non-military threats plague the region, notably smuggling, trafficking, piracy, illegal fishing and migration coinciding with the effects of climate change [7]. The subsequent failure of maritime states to initiate a collective and meaningful response has resulted in ongoing neglect of the rule of law and anxieties around the future stability of the Indo-Pacific. Regrettably, regional states cannot adequately protect themselves and the waters they rely upon unless they work together to improve the maritime capacity building of all regional states.

Capacity Building with a Focus on Maritime Security and Promoting the Rule of Law

Ratifying UNCLOS in 1994, Australia has publicised its commitment to the law of the sea and increasingly made efforts to support a rules-based order [8]. Australia has sought to engage in capacity building initiatives with Japan, one of the second-largest Asian economies and a leader in security and technology, as well as other regional maritime states [9]. Japan is an ideal partner for Australia to work with to promote international norms through hard maritime security measures such as shipbuilding, cybersecurity, and sonar developments. However, Australia-Japan schemes have not always run smoothly or successfully. Australia’s decision to turn down Japan’s offer of advanced Soryu-class submarines for France’s Barracuda-class boats in 2016 inevitably weakened trust as a long-term regional partner [10]. Although the decision was deemed a result of slow-moving processes with Japan, it also set back the strategic relationship between Canberra and Tokyo [11]. Impatience and prolonged decision-making were also contributing factors in other failed joint initiatives. For instance, it played out in Japan’s US-2i maritime surveillance aircraft deal with India, which failed to eventuate due to prolonged discussions and Japanese attitudes toward Indian red tape. These factors would also prove to have long-term implications for future submarine contracts, influencing Mitsubishi-Kawasaki to withdraw from the bidding to provide India with Soryu-class submarines worth US$9-10 billion [12]. In this way, Australia’s failure to prioritise its relationship with Japan and the latter’s inability to advance its projects has led to setbacks in terms of regional collaboration.

These tensions in the Australia-Japan relationship can hinder their ability to work with one another and successfully cooperate with other regional maritime states. Subsequently, a renewed emphasis on joint capacity building can help address increasing tensions and reinforce international law. This is highly relevant considering one of China’s recent attacks this year, in which the Chinese Coast Guard blasted water cannons at a Philippine resupply ship in March, destroying parts of the bridge and injuring crew members [13]. Situated in the Second Thomas Shoal, the superpower directly breached the 1972 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea [14]. The Philippines will require increased support from regional states if these kind of attacks continue to escalate.

Figure 1: Chinese coast guard blasts Philippine vessel with water cannons.
Source: Kyodo News+, “China Coast Guard Blasts Philippine Boat with Water Cannon,” March 23, 2024.

In partnership with Japan, Australia could lead in maritime capacity building initiatives to establish trust in Australian regional strategies and expand the capabilities of weaker Indo-Pacific nations, which will allow them to protect themselves and their resources. It is important to note that efforts are already underway to achieve this. For example, Japan has supported the Philippines Coast Guard (PCG) in the form of vessels and equipment, providing the PCG with two 94m Multi-Role Response Vessels (MRRVs) in 2022 and ten 44m class MRRVs from 2016-2018 [15]. These ships have expanded the PCG’s search and rescue, communication and monitoring capabilities [16]. Moreover, thirteen high-speed boats and advanced radar systems from Japan have enabled the PCG to rapidly detect unknown vessels [17]. Meanwhile, Pacific Island countries have also benefited from Australia’s Guardian-class patrol vessels, with 21 sent to various countries from 2018 to 2023 [18].

Australia and Japan have both sought to improve relations with India as a special strategic partner, with Japan sharing access to its defence facilities through Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements [19]. The continuation and expansion of such initiatives are essential. With the decision on who will build RAN’s general-class frigates imminent, Australia should keep the Mogami-class frigate of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) front of mind [20]. Not only will this demonstrate and reinforce trust in Japanese defence equipment, but it will provide Australia with the opportunity to acquire the new FFM that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is working on [21]. In strengthening their joint capabilities, Australia and Japan can help build the naval capacity of other regional maritime states.

Another area of potential collaboration is maritime cyber risk management, particularly with rising interest in maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS). Australia and Japan could encourage shipping organisations to adopt contractual requirements for cybersecurity guidelines to ensure proper procedure is established before and in the event of a cyberattack [22]. Further, they can strongly advocate support for a legally binding MASS code (set for 2028) and push for official recognition of cybercrime as unlawful under the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation [23]. Establishing these legal measures will allow for the safe implementation of Japan’s MEGURI2040 program by 2025 [24]. This project involves Japan’s testing of autonomous vessels to support the region and become a leader in this groundbreaking field [25]. With a focus on maritime security, Australia can work with Japan to enhance maritime cybersecurity capabilities in the Indo-Pacific.

Supporting a Regional Mechanism for Human Rights through Indo-Pacific Investment

Unlike other parts of the world, no regional mechanism or human rights (HR) treaty exists in the Indo-Pacific to formally protect human rights [26]. Without a committed institution to hold states accountable, there can be a lack of political will or incentive to uphold international HR law. Regional integration has also faced challenges due to protectionist measures by regional maritime states, preventing the organisation of a targeted and holistic response to threats [27]. In line with the Corruption Perception Index, Indo-Pacific states are some of the most corrupt in the world, marked by issues including but not limited to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, maritime piracy and human trafficking [28]. Deception at sea has also led to an increase in forced labour, with victims suffering from inhumane conditions, low wages, and susceptibility to other crimes [29]. Despite this, Indo-Pacific nations such as Malaysia and Singapore are yet to ratify respected HR treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) [30]. Moreover, Japan has no national HR institution, and Australia is reluctant to translate these international commitments into domestic legislation despite its absence of a federal Bill of Rights [31].

Official development assistance (ODA) and investment schemes are vital to supporting HR by building the capabilities of regional states and institutions [32]. However, Australia’s approach to ODA in the Indo-Pacific has not been perfect, having been described as “tight-fisted” and “misdirected” [33]. Partisan politics and domestic affairs strongly influence these programs as Australia seeks to embrace an Indo-Pacific narrative to bolster a sense of national belonging and draw attention away from the issues at hand [34]. Reluctant to make specific commitments and explicitly state how the country will draw on its strengths to provide aid, in many cases words have failed to produce action [35]. On the other hand, Japan has received criticism for its tendency to provide direction without adequate negotiation [36]. In this way, both countries would benefit from joint assistance programs that break down the top-down nature of their approaches, facilitate evaluation and feedback procedures, in order to draw on their collective strengths.

Australia and Japan should revise their ODA approaches by genuinely collaborating with regional maritime states and ensuring initiatives are Pacific-led, where leaders are not simply informed but actively involved in strategic planning and policymaking [37]. Specifically, cooperation between AusAID and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) could further bolster infrastructure development of Pacific Island nations, as they can build on the Nippon Export and Investment Insurance Agreement of 2018 [38]. As a pioneer of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Australia needs to utilise its membership and impressive loan policies to drive stronger infrastructure diplomacy, which is crucial as “infrastructure investment is becoming an important economic piece of the FOIP strategy” [39]. For example, maritime infrastructure development in Indonesia would increase domestic connectivity, efficiency and economic growth [40].

Indo-Pacific investment is a way for Australia and Japan to support the formation of a regional human rights mechanism (RHRM) and present themselves as undisputed leaders in the region [41]. It enables weaker maritime states to build their security capabilities to prevent HR abuses and promote regional stability. Specifically, international aid and funding can increase the ability of Pacific Island countries to effectively patrol and monitor their EEZ’s and train and equip maritime law enforcement (MLE) officers [42]. Interestingly, despite Australia’s recognition of its “relatively low” investment into Asia, outlined in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, the government has failed to produce significant change in the following years [43]. Scholar Shiro Armstrong has further commented that “Australia’s investment into Asia has failed to materialize in a major way” [44]. While Japan ranked fourth in 2023 as one of Australia’s top countries to invest in, Australia invests relatively little in Indo-Pacific countries like India and Taiwan, with investment falling between 2021-2022 [45].

Figure 2: Where does Australia invest? Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Foreign Investment Statistics, based on ABS catalogue 5352.0.

Comparatively, Japan and Singapore rank much higher, with their overall foreign direct investment increasing during this period, placing them respectively in 2021 as eighth and eleventh in the world [46].

Figure 3: How does this compare with other economies? Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Foreign Investment Statistics, based on UNCTAD World Investment Report – Annex tables.

Hosting the PALM Ministerial Interim Meetings and summits with Pacific Island countries, Japan has offered around US$460 million in assistance between 2015-2018 [47]. Furthermore, the Japan Coast Guard established the Mobile Cooperation Team in 2017 to work with and develop the capabilities of coastguards across the region [48]. Following Japan’s example, Australia can assist in targeting deeply rooted HR issues through Indo-Pacific investment and the sharing of knowledge and expertise on the Pacific Islands [49].

However, it is crucial that new procedures support rather than conflict with existing HR protections, for example, the legal, parliamentary and cultural systems of Pacific Island countries [50]. Failing to do so could result in RHRM that lacks cultural sensitivity and faces strong resistance [51]. Further, Australia and Japan must review successful cases of RHRMs to ensure an Indo-Pacific mechanism has the best chance of survival and produces favourable outcomes for all regional states. The success of an Australia-Japan joint initiative to combat HR violations and their increased regional investment will strengthen confidence in their ability to ease regional tensions, address distributional issues, and negotiate and prepare a RHRM that promotes international norms [52].

The Role of Technology and Law Enforcement Training in Encouraging Compliance to UNCLOS

In recent years, technological advancements have presented significant challenges for international maritime law to adapt quickly and effectively [53]. Legal gaps surrounding the disposal of nuclear waste, technology transfer, uncrewed vessels, and liability and accountability concerns are particularly relevant as UNCLOS fails to adequately address many of these issues [54]. This can provide states with the means to argue that advanced technologies can cross jurisdictional state boundaries on the basis that the law does not prohibit them from doing so [55]. Further, UNCLOS already suffers from inconsistencies as it “is a text with ambiguities, which were either deliberately left undecided or simply overlooked” [56]. For instance, while Part XIII of the Convention declares that coastal states must consent to marine scientific research conducted in specific zones, this is not abundantly clear regarding gliders or unmanned vessels that may enter new jurisdictional waters [57]. Ultimately, the rapidly changing environment can make it incredibly difficult for MLE to stay informed and act consistently with UNCLOS [58].

Although technological advancements problematise maritime law, they can also be part of the solution, promoting greater compliance with UNCLOS [59]. Australia and Japan can advocate for stricter compliance with UNCLOS by providing comprehensive training and educational courses to MLE in the Indo-Pacific and sharing technological advancements in AI, space technology and maritime surveillance [60]. Promoting a shift towards a maritime technology transfer regime will be necessary to explore how we can optimise AI to detect suspicious maritime activities and address uncertainties around how new and future technologies can fit into the UNCLOS regime [61]. Technological advancement in MLE will allow for the digitalisation of information systems, increased collaboration between law enforcement agencies, faster response times to maritime emergencies, reduced operational costs and increased efficiency [62]. Further, it has the potential to keep the law relevant by providing insight into maritime trends and changes [63]. Notably, Japan is a leader in space technology and artificial intelligence, providing opportunities for technology transfer and capacity-building with Australia in security-related fields [64]. Bilateral cooperation will enhance Australia’s space-based maritime surveillance and MLE monitoring and sensing capabilities [65]. This can create the space for an Indo-Pacific Maritime Law Enforcement Center to emerge [66]. Supported by Australia and Japan, there is the opportunity to produce organised MLE training programs, online resources and interactive virtual learning opportunities [67].

Aided by the 2022 Reciprocal Access Agreement, which provides shared military training and operations between countries, a regional Maritime Law Enforcement center would promote an Indo-Pacific that looks toward the future of MLE education [68]. Japan has already identified Vietnam as a recipient country for defence training, with the latter launching the Japanese satellite ASNARO-2 in 2019 and commencing discussion around Japanese scholarships in defence technology [69]. Furthermore, the Japanese Nippon Foundation has continued to run joint projects with the International Maritime Law Institute (IMLI) to organise capacity-building initiatives that train specialists in international maritime law conventions [70]. On the other hand, in coordination with the Philippine Civil Maritime Security Program (PCMSP), Australia has provided certified training modules on the law of the sea [71]. According to participants of the modules, over half found that the training they received was essential, and 42% deemed it to be very relevant [72].

Figure 4: The Relevance of Australia’s Training Modules for PCMSP Participants. Source: Philippine Civil Maritime Security Program (PCMSP). “Mid-Term Review Report.” (n.d.)

Australia and Japan should work collaboratively to establish a center sponsored by governments and international bodies and potentially based on the IMLI [73]. Established in the strategic location of Darwin, Australia, the Center should take an apolitical approach, overseeing a research branch that will enable it to target complex issues and facilitate regional MLE meetings that promote adherence to UNCLOS [74]. Policymakers should consult with the public and internal stakeholders to increase transparency around these ideas and manage expectations. Japan and Australia can also learn from Indonesia’s 2022 Government Regulation (PP) on security, safety and law enforcement [75]. The regulation seeks to integrate multiple agencies to reduce MLE response times to emergencies, allow for strategic resource allocation and increase the likelihood of cooperation with powerful international bodies [76]. Through policy learning, maritime nations can harmonise overlapping policies and effectively coordinate and educate MLE [77].

Conclusion

Regional capacity-building will contribute to a more peaceful Indo-Pacific by enabling states to promote international norms, support a RHRM, and advocate for greater compliance with international maritime law. This policy brief has explored opportunities for Australia to follow through with these objectives by building on its strategic partnership with Japan to protect themselves and Indo-Pacific states from maritime threats. A renewed focus on maritime security, Indo-Pacific investment and the development of marine technologies will create a more sustainable future that upholds and protects the rule of law.

Policy Recommendations

To build regional capacities and preserve international law, Australia should work with Japan to:

  1. Become leaders in maritime security capacity-building initiatives by supplying maritime states with advanced vessels and sonar equipment and developing cyber risk management systems.
  2. Revise their approach to ODA schemes in the Indo-Pacific by working in genuine collaboration with regional maritime states and providing sufficient funding to Pacific Island countries to develop their security and defence capabilities. Negotiate a RHRM in the Indo-Pacific through meaningful cooperation with Indo-Pacific states and policy learning.
  3. Advocate for stricter compliance with UNCLOS by providing joint training courses to MLE in the Indo-Pacific and exploring the possibility of a maritime law enforcement center.
  4. Engage in significant consultation with a broader scope of stakeholders, including NGOs, local communities and experts on the ground. In doing so, policymakers will gain an understanding of existing opportunities, the risks involved, and potential solutions.

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[48] Furuya, Kentaro. “Japan’s Coast Guard Diplomacy through Capacity Building in the Indo-Pacific.” In India-Japan-ASEAN Triangularity: Emergence of a Possible Indo-Pacific Axis?, edited by Jagannath P Panda, 120–34. Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003216766-9/japan-coast-guard-diplomacy-capacity-building-indo-pacific-kentaro-furuya

[49] Envall, H D P. “How Australia Can Work with Japan in the Indo-Pacific.” Griffith University, 2022. https://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0033/1491837/Envall-Australia-Japan_IndoPacific-web.pdf

[50] Liddicoat, Joy. “Human Rights Mechanisms in Small Pacific States: Implications for Dialogue about Regional Human Rights Mechanisms.” Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 40, no. 1 (June 1, 2009): 279–92. https://doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v40i1.5390.

[51] Liddicoat, Joy. “Human Rights Mechanisms in Small Pacific States: Implications for Dialogue about Regional Human Rights Mechanisms.” Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 40, no. 1 (June 1, 2009): 279–92. https://doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v40i1.5390.

[52] Amjad, Sohail, Muhammad I Khan, Sidra Kanwel, and Nazia Ayub. “The Role of Regional Agreements in Enhancing Enforcement of Maritime Crime Laws.” Asian Social Studies and Applied Research 2, no. 3 (August 2021): 503–10. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/376953131_The_Role_of_Regional_Agreements_in_Enhancing_Enforcement_of_Maritime_Crime_Laws.

[53] Zou, Keyuan, and Anastasia Telesetsky. “Marine Scientific Research, New Marine Technologies and the Law of the Sea an Introduction.” In Marine Scientific Research, New Marine Technologies and the Law of the Sea, edited by Keyuan Zou and Anastasia Telesetsky, 1–6. Brill Publishers, 2021. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uwa/detail.action?docID=6737273&query=%26quot;Marine%20Scientific%20Research,%20New%20Marine%20Technologies%20and%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea%20an%20Introduction.%26quot;%20

[54] Zou, Keyuan, and Anastasia Telesetsky. “Marine Scientific Research, New Marine Technologies and the Law of the Sea an Introduction.” In Marine Scientific Research, New Marine Technologies and the Law of the Sea, edited by Keyuan Zou and Anastasia Telesetsky, 1–6. Brill Publishers, 2021. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uwa/detail.action?docID=6737273&query=%26quot;Marine%20Scientific%20Research,%20New%20Marine%20Technologies%20and%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea%20an%20Introduction.%26quot;%20

[55] Zou, Keyuan, and Anastasia Telesetsky. “Marine Scientific Research, New Marine Technologies and the Law of the Sea an Introduction.” In Marine Scientific Research, New Marine Technologies and the Law of the Sea, edited by Keyuan Zou and Anastasia Telesetsky, 1–6. Brill Publishers, 2021. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uwa/detail.action?docID=6737273&query=%26quot;Marine%20Scientific%20Research,%20New%20Marine%20Technologies%20and%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea%20an%20Introduction.%26quot;%20

[56] Zou, Keyuan, and Anastasia Telesetsky. “Marine Scientific Research, New Marine Technologies and the Law of the Sea an Introduction.” In Marine Scientific Research, New Marine Technologies and the Law of the Sea, edited by Keyuan Zou and Anastasia Telesetsky, 1–6. Brill Publishers, 2021. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uwa/detail.action?docID=6737273&query=%26quot;Marine%20Scientific%20Research,%20New%20Marine%20Technologies%20and%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea%20an%20Introduction.%26quot;%20

[57] Zou, Keyuan, and Anastasia Telesetsky. “Marine Scientific Research, New Marine Technologies and the Law of the Sea an Introduction.” In Marine Scientific Research, New Marine Technologies and the Law of the Sea, edited by Keyuan Zou and Anastasia Telesetsky, 1–6. Brill Publishers, 2021. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uwa/detail.action?docID=6737273&query=%26quot;Marine%20Scientific%20Research,%20New%20Marine%20Technologies%20and%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea%20an%20Introduction.%26quot;%20

[58] Bergin, Anthony. “A New Regional Maritime Confidence Building Measure: The Indo-Pacific Maritime Law Enforcement Centre.” Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs 13, no. 3 (March 8, 2021): 150–6. https://doi.org/10.1080/18366503.2021.1894795.

[59] Maruf, Irma R. “The Importance of Digital Transformation in Maritime Law Enforcement at Sea.” Jurnal Ilmu Hukum 14, no. 2 (2024): 118–27. https://doi.org/10.58471/justi.v14i02.

[60] Bergin, Anthony. “A New Regional Maritime Confidence Building Measure: The Indo-Pacific Maritime Law Enforcement Centre.” Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs 13, no. 3 (March 8, 2021): 150–6. https://doi.org/10.1080/18366503.2021.1894795.

[61] Zou, Keyuan, and Anastasia Telesetsky. “Marine Scientific Research, New Marine Technologies and the Law of the Sea an Introduction.” In Marine Scientific Research, New Marine Technologies and the Law of the Sea, edited by Keyuan Zou and Anastasia Telesetsky, 1–6. Brill Publishers, 2021. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uwa/detail.action?docID=6737273&query=%26quot;Marine%20Scientific%20Research,%20New%20Marine%20Technologies%20and%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea%20an%20Introduction.%26quot;%20

[62] Maruf, Irma R. “The Importance of Digital Transformation in Maritime Law Enforcement at Sea.” Jurnal Ilmu Hukum 14, no. 2 (2024): 118–27. https://doi.org/10.58471/justi.v14i02

[63] Maruf, Irma R. “The Importance of Digital Transformation in Maritime Law Enforcement at Sea.” Jurnal Ilmu Hukum 14, no. 2 (2024): 118–27. https://doi.org/10.58471/justi.v14i02.

[64] Graham, Euan. “Maritime Security and Capacity-Building: The Australia-Japan Dimension.” In Beyond the Hub and Spokes: Australia-Japan Security Cooperation, edited by William Tow and Tomonori Yoshizaki, 43–57. The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2014. https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series10/pdf/03.pdf

[65] Graham, Euan. “Maritime Security and Capacity-Building: The Australia-Japan Dimension.” In Beyond the Hub and Spokes: Australia-Japan Security Cooperation, edited by William Tow and Tomonori Yoshizaki, 43–57. The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2014. https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series10/pdf/03.pdf

[66] Bergin, Anthony. “A New Regional Maritime Confidence Building Measure: The Indo-Pacific Maritime Law Enforcement Centre.” Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs 13, no. 3 (March 8, 2021): 150–6. https://doi.org/10.1080/18366503.2021.1894795.

[67] Maruf, Irma R. “The Importance of Digital Transformation in Maritime Law Enforcement at Sea.” Jurnal Ilmu Hukum 14, no. 2 (2024): 118–27. https://doi.org/10.58471/justi.v14i02.

[68] Bergin, Anthony. “A New Regional Maritime Confidence Building Measure: The Indo-Pacific Maritime Law Enforcement Centre.” Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs 13, no. 3 (March 8, 2021): 150–6. https://doi.org/10.1080/18366503.2021.1894795; Dean, Peter J. “Australia’s Future Navy: The Japanese Option.” The Maritime Executive, March 3, 2024. https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/australia-s-future-navy-the-japanese-option.

[69] Naidu, G.V.C., and Yasuyuki Ishida. “Japan’s Security Reforms under Abe Shinzo: Setting the Stage for Proactivism in the Indo-Pacific?” Strategic Analysis 46, no. 3 (May 4, 2022): 277–292. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2022.2086356.

[70] García-Carriazo, Ángeles J. “Building Capacity in the Law of the Sea: The IMO International Maritime Law Institute’s Experience.” Stockton Center for International Law, 2023. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol100/iss1/7/

[71] Philippine Civil Maritime Security Program (PCMSP). “Mid-Term Review Report.” Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/philippine-civil-maritime-security-program-phase-1-mid-term-review-report.pdf

[72] Philippine Civil Maritime Security Program (PCMSP). “Mid-Term Review Report.” Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/philippine-civil-maritime-security-program-phase-1-mid-term-review-report.pdf

[73] García-Carriazo, Ángeles J. “Building Capacity in the Law of the Sea: The IMO International Maritime Law Institute’s Experience.” Stockton Center for International Law, 2023. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol100/iss1/7/

[74] Bergin, Anthony. “A New Regional Maritime Confidence Building Measure: The Indo-Pacific Maritime Law Enforcement Centre.” Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs 13, no. 3 (March 8, 2021): 150–6. https://doi.org/10.1080/18366503.2021.1894795.

[75] Maruf, Irma R. “The Importance of Digital Transformation in Maritime Law Enforcement at Sea.” Jurnal Ilmu Hukum 14, no. 2 (2024): 118–27. https://doi.org/10.58471/justi.v14i02.

[76] Maruf, Irma R. “The Importance of Digital Transformation in Maritime Law Enforcement at Sea.” Jurnal Ilmu Hukum 14, no. 2 (2024): 118–27. https://doi.org/10.58471/justi.v14i02.

[77] Amjad, Sohail, Muhammad I Khan, Sidra Kanwel, and Nazia Ayub. “The Role of Regional Agreements in Enhancing Enforcement of Maritime Crime Laws.” Asian Social Studies and Applied Research 2, no. 3 (August 2021): 503–10. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/376953131_The_Role_of_Regional_Agreements_in_Enhancing_Enforcement_of_Maritime_Crime_Laws.

Front page image:

The image is a U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Stephen W. Rowe

It shows the USS KITTY HAWK at sea, with naval ships from India, Australia, Japan, Singapore, and the United States in the Bay of Bengal during Exercise Malabar 07-2 on Sept. 5. The formation included USS Kitty Hawk, USS Nimitz, INS Viraat, JS Yuudachi, JS Ohnami, RSS Formidable, HMAS Adelaide, INS Ranvijay, INS Brahmaputra, INS Ranjit, USS Chicago and USS Higgins.